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Abstract
Managing disagreement in conversation requires subtle
linguistic and pragmatics skills. One key dimension is the
degree of ‘knowingness’ with which people present their
stance on an issue. It has been hypothesised that framing
stances as ‘knowing’, i.e. with higher implied levels of
speaker certainty limits the potential for challenge by others.
We present the first experimental test of this hypothesis. Using
a text based chat-tool paradigm and a debating task we are
able to systematically manipulate how ‘knowing’ people’s
turns appear to one-another. The results show that ‘knowing’
stances tend to close off discussion leading to less carefully
formulated, truncated turns, but do not reliably affect the range
of solutions considered. Unknowing stances, by contrast,
do not affect turn length or formulation but do encourage
more deliberation and include more signals of certainty in the
message contents.
Keywords: Dialogue; Interaction; Disagreement; Stance;
Deliberation.
Introduction
During a debate people have choices about how they present
their contributions. Amongst other things they can simply
assert their position, they can modify it with a propositional
attitude verb such as ‘know’ or ‘think’ or they can turn an
assertion into a question rephrasing “’I think X” as “Do you
think X?”. These choices of attitude and modality all help to
establish what a person’s stance is and, in combination with
the choices made by their interlocutor, set the tone and di-
rection of a debate. One of the most important hypotheses
about the impact of different stance markers on dialogue re-
lates to expressions of epistemic certainty; framing of a stance
as ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’ appears to significantly alter the
deliberative quality of a discussion Heritage (2012a).
Although the interactional dimensions of stance have been
discussed in some detail (Du Bois, 2007; Englebretson, 2007;
Ka¨rkka¨inen, 2003), this work is based on case studies and cor-
pus analyses. The causal effects of adopting different stance
markers on the subsequent trajectory of a dialogue has not, as
far as we are aware, been directly tested. One key reason for
this is the practical difficulty of manipulating stance mark-
ers in a live dialogue. Here we use a technique introduced
by Healey et al. (2003) that takes advantage of the potential
of text-chat for enabling selective manipulation of people’s
turns, including the addition of stance markers, without their
awareness. We use this technique to to assess how the epis-
temic status of a stance, i.e. whether it is framed as either
unknowing or knowing, impacts on the quality of the joint ac-
tion and deliberation in discussion dialogues.
Knowing vs unknowing epistemic status
Heritage (2012a) defines ‘epistemic status’ as the relative po-
sitioning in which “persons recognize one another to be more
or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowl-
edge”. Knowing all (K+) is typically conveyed through
declaratives, while interrogative grammatical format is the
most explicit way that a speaker can embody an ‘unknowing’
(K-) epistemic status. For example, the question ’what time
is your appointment’ positions the speaker in request of infor-
mation, where as ‘your appointment is at 3pm’ positions the
speaker in a K+ position. However, as highlighted by Drew
(2012), how much speakers know relative to one another is
not only encoded in the grammatical format, but also in in-
congruities between epistemic status and grammatical format,
for example in posing a question to which you already know
the answer (e.g. ‘Aren’t you going to be late?’). Speakers’
relative positioning can alter from moment to moment, and
be “disassembled by persons who deploy epistemic stance
to appear more, or less knowledgeable than they really are”
(Heritage, 2012a). There are significant potential social and
interactional implications of positioning ourselves or others
as either knowing or unknowing (Levinson, 2012).
In issuing a question the requester assumes an unknow-
ing epistemic status and positions the recipient in a knowing
one (Heritage, 2012a), creating an obligation for the recipient
to respond (Levinson, 2012). Levinson (2012) observes that
people prefer polar questions to other forms that require more
knowledge-rich responses and often disguise them as asser-
tions, thus demonstrating an unwillingness to locate oneself
in an unknowing position, nor to impose too greatly upon an
interlocutor by demanding a response. However, in a discus-
sion context, in which individual contributions on the topic
under discussion are warranted and expected, the ways in
which requests are made could be influential to the deliber-
ative quality of the discussion.
Furthermore, between the most explicit formats of K+ and
K- constructions (i.e. declaratives and interrogatives), there
are a range of other ways that speakers can encode epistemic
stance, such as modals, hedges and epistemic adverbs, which
can convey levels of speaker certainty, e.g. ‘It was definitely
red’, and commitment ‘I absolutely think...’ and evidential
markings which convey the source of a knowledge claim (i.e.
direct evidentials based on sensorial/ visual evidence and in-
direct evidentials, such as inference and hearsay). Particu-
larly within a discussion context the management of imbal-
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ances in epistemic status is particularly pertinent as partic-
ipants’ contributions must necessarily negotiate alternative
stance positions.
Stance and Disagreement
Work in the emergent field of interactional linguistics posits
that stance-taking is a fundamentally intersubjective process,
with stance positions being co-constructed through interac-
tion (Englebretson, 2007; Du Bois, 2007). This process of
stance co-construction relies upon the expression of opposi-
tions and alternatives. Disagreement is one perspicuous so-
cial activity which denotes the negotiation of differing stances
and a potential process by which a shift in stance can oc-
cur. Disagreement is generally minimised in conversation
(Pomerantz, 1984; Concannon et al., 2015a), and tends to
be problematic when issued without mitigation (Chiu, 2008;
Concannon et al., 2015b). However, in certain contexts, such
as problem solving and discussion tasks, it can be important
for advancing the deliberative quality of a dialogue and en-
couraging novel contributions (Chiu, 2008).
There is thus a delicate balance between mitigating the so-
cially problematic aspects of disagreement while still being
able to identify and resolve differences of opinion. This bal-
ance can be achieved in many different ways. Resources such
as ‘well’-prefacing (Pomerantz, 1984), stance markers such
as ‘I think’ (Ka¨rkka¨inen, 2003) and reported speech (Holt &
Clift, 2007; Concannon et al., 2015b) all provide less explicit
ways of marking what follows as potentially incongruous or
in opposition to what went before.
Marking Stance in the Balloon Task
The task chosen for the experiment reported below is the Bal-
loon Task. Participants are presented with a fictional scenario
in which an hot air balloon is losing altitude and about to
crash. The only way for any of three passengers to survive
is for one of them to jump to a certain death. The three pas-
sengers are: Dr. Nick Riviera, a cancer scientist, Mrs. Susie
Derkins, a pregnant primary school teacher, and Mr. Tom
Derkins, the balloon pilot and Susie’s husband. The advan-
tages of this task are that it is effective at generating debates
between subjects and there is good scope for deliberation. To
ensure we chose a relatively natural manipulation of epis-
temic stance for this task an initial analysis was conducted
using control condition transcripts from previous balloon task
discussions. Twelve transcripts were analysed for markers
that conveyed ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’ states in relation to
stance marking. ‘I think’ was frequently used as a resource
to mark a stance position. ‘I think’ has been attributed a dual
function, and can can also act as a hedge (Holmes, 1990),
however in the discussion context it was used most frequently
to convey a knowing stance, particularly when at the begin-
ning of a turn.
(1) a. I think Tom should definitely stay in the balloon
b. I think Nick should definitely be the one to go
c. I think because there’s an element of risk with whether
Nick will actually end up coming up with a cure for
cancer ... There’s no point taking two risks by then
letting go of Tom
d. i think we have a couple mins left
e. A: so tom has to jump?
B: i think so
In 1a, 1b and 1c the marker ‘I think’ serves to accentuate
the propositional content and emphasise the speaker’s com-
mitment to their proposition and focuses on a substantive as-
pect, namely, who should be sacrificed. In 1d and 1e, how-
ever, the marker performs the opposite effect and suggests a
lack of speaker commitment and acts as a hedging marker.
There were 44 instances of ‘I think’ in the transcripts, 34 in-
stances (77.27%) served to emphasise the propositional con-
tent it was associated with, eight instances (18.18%) acted in
a ‘hedging’ or unknowing capacity, and the two remaining in-
stances made manifest the cognate processes (e.g.“whenever
i think that nick should go, i think ‘Are susie and tom really
that important?’”). Of the 44 instances, 25 were turn-initial
(56.82%), 19 of which served to emphasise the speaker’s
ownership and commitment to the content that followed. Four
instances of turn-initial ‘I think’ (20%) were constructed in
such a way that ‘I think’ functioned as a hedging marker
and two instances were not possible to classify due to insuffi-
cient context (e.g. ‘I think overall’). Closer inspection of the
use cases showed that all instances of turn-initial ‘I think’,
in which the proceeding content featured a character from
the scenario, conveyed a ‘knowing’ stance. As such, using
‘I think’ as a turn-initial insertion for turns which contain a
mention of one of the scenario’s characters, should increase
the likelihood of a consistent effect of framing the utterance
as ‘knowing’, rather than performing a hedging effect.
While looking for markers which served to downgrade the
epistemic strength of assertions, ‘do you think’ was one such
‘unknowing’ device that was used in the transcripts.
A: do you think the married couple would gang up on
the doctor and throw him out
B: maybe. he is their friend though
‘Do you think’ makes a minimised contrast pair with ‘I think’
and can be inserted at a turn-initial position without changing
the content of the turn. Consequently, ‘I think’ and ‘do you
think’ were selected as our turn-initial inserts, to perform the
role of framing the proceeding content as more or less ‘know-
ing’.
Hypothesis
Following Heritage (2012b) our general hypothesis is that
framing a proposition as unknowing invites elaboration, se-
quence expansion and further discussion of the topic at hand
(Heritage, 2012b). Conversely, a more knowing epistemic
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stance, creates pressure for confirmation and sequence clos-
ing. As such, we predict that inserting ‘knowing’ and ‘un-
knowing’ stance markers will have different impacts on the
course of a conversation even where, counterfactually, noth-
ing about the content of the modified assertions is changed.
The analysis of previous dialogues enables us to opera-
tionalise our general hypothesis about the level of knowing-
ness with which opinions are presented and inform the fol-
lowing predictions:
1. Fewer possible solutions will be considered when contribu-
tions are framed as knowing and responses will be less con-
sidered; this should affect turn formulation, with shorter
typing times and less editing of turns. Framing contribu-
tions as knowing will close down the dialogue, as indicated
by shorter and fewer turns.
2. Framing contributions as unknowing will open up dia-
logues, leading to longer turns and more possible solutions
considered.
3. More possible solutions will be considered and more care
will be taken in the construction of turns, as evidenced by
slower typing times and more edits when contributions are
introduced with an unknowing preface (‘do you think X’).
4. Framing contributions as unknowing will lead to higher
frequencies of certainty and uncertainty markers.
Method
In this experiment, to see how the epistemic framing of a
contribution affects levels of deliberation in dyadic text-based
conversations, participant contributions were manipulated us-
ing the DiET chat tool.
The DiET chat tool
The participants communicate via a specially programmed
chat tool, similar to other instant messenger interfaces they
may have used previously. The Dialogue Experimental
Toolkit (DiET) chat tool is a text-based chat interface facil-
itating real time manipulations of the dialogue. It is possible
to programme several different types of interventions using
the chat tool: turns may be altered prior to transmission, turns
may not be relayed, and additional turns may be added, (e.g.
Healey et al. (2003), insertion of spoof clarification requests).
These manipulations occur as the dialogue progresses, thus
making them minimally disruptive to the sequence of dia-
logue.
Design
The experiment was conducted in pairs, with 10 dyads per
condition. Pairs of participants were presented with a dis-
cussion task and instructed to discuss for 30 minutes and
attempt to come to an agreement. Each pair of participants
was assigned at random to one of three conditions; i) Control
ii) Knowing iii) Unknowing. In the Control condition there
were no interventions performed by the server; participants
received the dialogue turns exactly as they were typed. In
the Knowing condition turn-Initial ‘I think’ insertions were
made and in the Unknowing condition ‘Do you think’ inser-
tions were added turn-initially. Manipulations were carried
out every four turns, if and only if the turn included a ref-
erence to one of the characters in the scenario (e.g. Doctor,
Susie, etc.). Interventions are not visible to the individual
whose turn has been manipulated, only the recipient, so that
there is no awareness that turns are being intercepted before
being relayed. A pilot study was conducted to establish the
acceptable frequency of interventions.
Subjects and materials
The experiment was carried out on thirty pairs of students (41
females and 19 males) from the University of London who
each received £7.50 or course credits for providing an hour
of their time. They were invited to attend with someone they
already knew to increase the likelihood that inter-pair partic-
ipants were acquainted. All subjects were native speakers of
English. Pairs of participants were seated at separate comput-
ers, at opposite ends of shared office1 and given an instruction
sheet detailing the balloon task (see above for a description).
Participants were told to take as much time as they needed to
read the summary of the situation and then discuss with their
partners via a chat tool set up on the computer at which they
were seated.
Analysis
The DiET chat tool records all interventions and key presses,
including edits made before participants press ENTER. For a
simple measure of authorial commitment counting frequen-
cies of epistemic adverbials, modals and hedges were col-
lected. Epistemic adverbials are separated into two categories
(adapted from Biber et al. (1999); Biber & Finegan (1988)):
those which express certainty (e.g., surely, obviously) and
those which express anything less than certainty, such as pos-
sibility or probability (e.g., maybe, probably). Our separa-
tion between those that express certainty and possibility is
to acknowledge that through probability there is less autho-
rial commitment. Uncertainty Markers therefore include un-
certainty adverbials as well as modals (‘may’, ‘might’ and
‘could’) and hedges (‘quite’, ‘sort of’, etc.), but certainty
and uncertainty adverbials are also presented individually for
comparison2 Obvious typographical errors were corrected to
1The experiment took place in an open plan office and there were
other colleagues working quietly in the room. Participants were
made aware of this before the experiment started, so that they were
not distracted by this.
2The full list of words and phrases used for each category, are
as follows:- Certainty adverbials: absolutely, actually, certainly,
clearly, plainly, definitely, evidently, indeed, obviously, really, surely,
undoubtedly, unquestionably, for certain, for sure, of course; Uncer-
tainty adverbials: allegedly, apparently, arguably, conceivably, inex-
plicably, likely, maybe, perhaps, possibly, potentially, presumably,
probably, reportedly, seemingly, supposedly; Uncertainty modals:
may, might, can, could and Hedges: quite, sort of, kind of , might,
a bit, a little bit, just, at least, approximately, about, around, some-
thing like, almost, pretty, sometimes.
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increase the accuracy of the frequency counts (e.g. possibiliyt
–> possibility). The inserted fragments were also removed
from the transcripts before frequency counts were conducted,
to ensure that the figures reflected only what the participants
actively contributed.
The decision processes were hand labelled for each con-
versation to detect the decision patterns for each participant.
The transcripts were hand coded for the solutions being con-
sidered (for example, Undecided, Kill Tom, Kill Susie, Kill
Nick) and the number of shifts from one solution to another
during the conversation (e.g. Kill Susie –> Undecided –>
Kill Tom). Furthermore, turns were counted in which partic-
ipant A and B had matching or opposing stance states. Time
spent in an undecided state, even if both participant A and B
both were undecided is not counted as a matching stance as
it is unclear what their current stance is. A matching stance
would only be A: Tom B: Tom; A: Nick B: Nick or A: Susie
B: Susie.
Results
Table 1 provides the means for total number of words typed,
turns and average words per turn per participant, the mean
typing time in milliseconds, the speed of typing and details
of the various self-edits participants made during turn con-
struction, such as deletion and insertion of characters before
pressing send to relay the message to their partner. Standard
Deviations are provided in parentheses.
Table 1: Message construction data, per participant
Control Unknowing Knowing
Total Words 618.30
(182.12)
641.95
(160.28)
649.05
(196.08)
Total Turns 81.05 (35.91) 74.35 (34.57) 94.65
(37.50)
Words/Turn 8.71 (4.43) 9.45 (3.62) 6.65 (1.87)
Type Time 16005.50
(8118.06)
17279.88
(10793.22)
12988.29
(5300.58)
Type Speed 3.09 (0.88 ) 3.71 (1.17) 3.26 (0.81)
Self-
edits(Ins)
0.25 (3.79) 0.31 (0.68) 0.03 (0.10)
Self-
edits(Del)
53.32
(125.10)
73.38
(169.25)
20.41
(49.01)
Word counts A nonparametric Kruskal Wallis independent
samples test shows that there is a significant omnibus effect
of condition on the number of words typed per turn (H(2)
= 7.475 , p= 0.02). A post hoc pairwise comparison using
Dunn’s test shows that there is a significant difference in the
number of words per turn between the Knowing and Unknow-
ing cconditionondition, with Knowing dialogues containing
fewer words per turn and Unknowing dialogues containing
more words per turn (p= 0.02). There is no significant dif-
ference between the number of words typed per turn in the
Control and Unknowing conditions (p= 0.74), nor Knowing
and Control conditions (p= 0.35). A nonparametric Kruskal
Wallis independent samples test shows that the total number
of words typed was not significantly affected by the condition
(H(2) = 0.283, p= 0.87) and there is no significant effect of
condition on the number of turns per dialogue (H(2) = 3.556 ,
p= 0.17).
Typing time Typing time averaged by participant was anal-
ysed using a Generalised Linear Mixed Models analysis
(GLMM) with a Gamma distribution because the timing data
was positively skewed. Participants was included as a ran-
dom factor and condition as a fixed factor. This shows a clear
main effect of condition (F(2,59)=13.18, p<0.00). The es-
timated marginal means are: Control: 12,139, Unknowing:
13,404 and Knowing: 8,813. Pairwise Contrasts show that
the Knowing condition has shorter typing times than Control
(t = -3.606, p<0.00) and shorter than the Unknowing condi-
tion (t = -4.87, p<0.00) but Unknowing and Control are not
reliably different (t = 1.16, p=0.25).
Self-edits The mean number of self-edit insertions per turn
is substantially lower in the Knowing condition than the Con-
trol and Unknowing conditions. A Kruskal Wallis test shows
that there is a significant omnibus effect of condition on the
number of Self-edits (Inserts) per participant (H(2) = 7.761,
p=0.02). A post hoc pairwise comparison using the Dunn’s
method shows that there are significantly fewer Self-edits (In-
serts) in the Knowing condition than the Unknowing condi-
tion (p=0.04), but no significant difference between Know-
ing and Control (p=0.06), nor Unknowing and Control con-
dition (p=1.0). The mean number of self-edit deletions per
turn is higher in the Unknowing condition than the Control
and Knowing conditions. However, a non-parametric Kruskal
Wallis test shows that there is no significant effect of condi-
tion on the number of Self-edits (Deletions) (H(2) = 4.560,
p=0.10).
Epistemic Strength Table 2 provides mean frequencies
of epistemic markers, adverbials of certainty, adverbials
of uncertainty and combined uncertainty markers (adver-
bials,hedges,modals) per 100 words. A non-parametric
Table 2: Epistemic marker mean frequencies
Condition Certainty
Adverbials
Uncertainty
Adverbial
Uncertainty
Markers
Control 0.28 (0.25) 0.54 (0.32) 4.69 (1.12)
Knowing 0.33 (0.34) 0.55 (0.21) 4.60 (1.19)
Unknowing 0.67 (0.35) 0.65 (0.39) 4.69 (0.88)
Total 0.43 (0.35) 0.58 (0.31) 4.66 (1.04)
Kruskal Wallis test shows that there is an omnibus effect
of condition on the frequency of certainty adverbs (H(2) =
7.501 p=0.02). A post-hoc pairwise comparison Dunn’s test
shows that there are significantly more certainty adverbs in
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the Unknowing condition compared to the Control condi-
tion (p=0.04), but no significant difference in frequencies be-
tween the Control and Knowing (p=1.00), nor Knowing and
Unknowing conditions (p=0.08). A non-parametric Kruskal
Wallis test shows that there is no omnibus effect of condi-
tion on the mean frequencies of uncertainty adverbials (H(2)
= 0.742 p=0.690) or combined uncertainty markers (H(2) =
0.148 p=0.93).
Deliberation quality Table 3 details the mean number of
changes from a given stance position to another per partic-
ipant over the course of the dialogue for each condition, as
well as the total number of possible alternatives considered.
Table 3: Mean stance shifts during dialogue and possible so-
lutions considered per participant by condition
Condition Shifts in Stance Solutions Considered
Control 4.85 (1.84) 3.10 (0.97)
Unknowing 6.80 (2.63) 3.30 (0.66)
Knowing 4.55 (1.61) 2.75 (0.55)
Total 5.40 (2.27) 3.05 (0.77)
There are a third more stance shifts in the Unknowing con-
dition than the Control and Knowing conditions. A Kruskal
Wallis non-parametric test shows that there is a significant
omnibus effect of condition on the number of stance shifts
traversed by a participant (H(2) = 9.559 p=0.008). A planned
pairwise post hoc comparison using the Dunn’s test shows
that there are significantly more stance shifts in the Unknow-
ing condition than the Knowing condition (p=0.01) but no
confirmed significant effect between Unknowing and Control
(p=0.06). There is an omnibus effect of condition on num-
ber of possible solutions considered (H(2) = 6.146 p<0.05).
There are more possible solutions considered in the Unknow-
ing condition than the Knowing condition (p=0.044). There
is no significant difference between Knowing and Control
(p=0.33) and nor Control and Unknowing (p=.1.00).
Table 4 provides details of the mean percentage of turns in
which participant A and B had matching and opposing stance
states across conditions.
Table 4: Mean percent of dialogue in which participant A and
B had matching and opposing stances
Condition Turns: Matching Turns: Opposing
Control 39.42% 60.58%
Unknowing 48.27% 51.73%
Knowing 32.74% 67.26%
Total Mean 40.15% 59.85%
Although, the distributions show approximately 16% dif-
ference in the ratio of opposing and matching stances be-
tween Knowing and Unknowing conditions, with more turns
covered with opposing stances in the Knowing condition and
more matching stances in the Unknowing condition. A non-
parametric Kruskal Wallis test find no significant effect of
condition on the distribution of oppositional and matching
stance states amongst participants (H(2) = 3.850 p=0.15).
Discussion
In line with our prediction, the results show that framing
statements as unknowing led to more deliberation in the di-
alogues. Not only was there a higher numbers of shifts in
stance, indicating a thorough deliberation going back and
forth over the possible solutions, there was also a fuller ex-
ploration of the total possible solutions (i.e. participants in
the Unknowing condition were more likely to consider all of
the four possible outcomes, and consider each person to be
ejected rather than just sticking to one or two).
The results show that the introduction of the knowing
stance marker ‘I think’ leads to fewer words per turn, i.e.
shorter, or more terse responses. In part this may be so to the
declarative format, compared to the question format of ‘do
you think’, which obligates a reply. The greater efficiency
in the construction of dialogue turns suggests that the intro-
duction of the knowing stance marker leads to more direct ex-
change of opinions, which is supported by the fewer edits dur-
ing turn construction in this condition. Less care is taken in
the Knowing condition to alter the message prior to relaying it
to a conversational partner, perhaps leading to less delicately
constructed or polite turns, but more direct and less guarded
opinion exchange. The results show that prefacing statements
with a knowing preface (i.e. ‘I think’) forecloses the con-
versation, while the framing of the contribution with do you
think leads to more considered and extended responses.
Counter to our predictions there was no significant ef-
fect of condition on the frequency of expressions of uncer-
tainty. However, significantly more certainty adverbials are
employed by participants in the Unknowing condition com-
pared to the Control condition. This suggests that framing
contributions as unknowing creates an environment in which
participants are more likely to make manifest their commit-
ment to a stance by upgrading the epistemic strength of a
statement through certainty adverbials; as solutions are dis-
cussed more and potentially co-constructed, once a stance is
established it can be committed to with greater conviction
by participants in the Unknowing condition. So, although
the Knowing condition features less guarded and more direct
messages as indicated in the manner in which they are con-
structed, it is in the Unknowing condition that participants
commit more firmly to the substantive essence of their utter-
ance.
Interpreting these results together suggests that the intro-
duction of ‘Do you think’ opens up the dialogue, inviting
further elaboration of the topic at hand, while introducing ‘I
think’ closes down the dialogue and limits the deliberative
quality of the discussion. ‘Do you think’ positions the speaker
in a position of unknowing epistemic status, and also directly
invokes the hearer to collaborate in the co-construction of a
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joint stance. In the Unknowing condition stance positions are
more explicitly emphasised through certainty adverbials, i.e.
when something is important, participants take care to make
clear the focus of their stance and their strength of commit-
ment to a given proposition. In part this may be due to the
fact that ‘do you think’ directly invites input and therefore
greater care is taken to make clear exactly what the opinion
to which they are attaching themselves is. The interactive ne-
gotiation of the stance is more exaggerated. Conversely, the
introduction of ‘I think’ to the dialogue has the opposite ef-
fect: the presentation of a knowing stance, leads to less con-
sideration and more conviction among participants, demon-
strated through fewer edits when constructing responses and
more terse and direct turns. Opinions are expressed plainly
and without additional specification.
Conclusion
In this paper the causal effects of epistemic status, as ex-
pressed through particular stance markers, on the deliberative
quality of a dialogue were investigated using an experimental
approach. Framing a statement as unknowing has a signifi-
cant impact on the deliberative quality of a dialogue and in-
creases the likelihood that participants will consider multiple
possible solutions, shifting their opinion more times before
reaching a concluding stance. Furthermore, participants in
the Unknowing condition, spent a larger proportion of dia-
logues considering one another’s stance. This suggests that,
within a discussion dialogue, the framing of a statement in
a unknowing way can lead to a more flexible deliberation
process and a greater willingness to engage with alternative
viewpoints. Furthermore, while being more considerate of
one another’s views, this was not to the detriment of express-
ing a position with conviction, and actually led to greater dis-
plays of speaker commitment to a stance through certainty
adverbials.
Framing a statement as knowing affects the ways in which
individuals produce messages; specifically, they construct
shorter and less edited responses. This suggests that there
is less care taken in the construction of messages, and less
conscientious effort put into producing polite, or considered
turns. Shorter messages are typically more direct and the lack
of editing may reflect decreased guardedness. By prefacing
statements with ‘I think’, the context is set for the exchange of
opinions; by introducing a stance with a knowing marker, the
appropriateness for a response which is equally direct is es-
tablished. Overall it seems that marking stances with a know-
ing preface leads to more direct and unguarded exchanges,
but does not improve the deliberative quality of the dialogues.
Conversely, prefacing statements with the unknowing preface
‘do you think’ encourages a more collaborative deliberation,
in which more possible solutions are considered in turn be-
fore a final decision is reached.
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